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Faced with the fact of sweeping regulatory reform, how do companies decide how to 
respond to a new set of policies?  This paper argues that this problem requires a new 
conception of policymaking:  a conception that recognizes the analytical primacy of 
achieving coordination under uncertainty.  I call this challenge the problem of securing 
decentralized cooperation.  Negotiated reforms are a common leitmotif of the current 
wave of reforms taking place in various European countries, whereas American attempts 
to reinvent government opt to replace the state with the market.  There are general lessons 
in this approach for both strategies.  Unlike the earlier attempts to establish neo-
corporatist bargains at the national level in European countries, the success of bargained 
pacts in Europe will depend increasingly on allowing private actors to design the best 
solutions to centrally identified problems.  The challenges of bringing private information 
to bear on public policy will increase in the future, and not only in supply-side economic 
policy reforms.  One such area is environmental regulation, which is typically viewed as 
an area of pure state regulation. This is also an area where market-based solutions are 
frequently proposed as the most efficient solution to problems of pollution.  As I 
demonstrate through the initiative of the Chesapeake Bay Program in the United States, 
the challenges identified above for areas of economic policymaking are now relevant to 
environmental initiatives, even in liberal market economies such as the US and the UK.  
The extent of government success in such initiatives will be determined by the ability of 
governments to understand the importance of private information and their capacity to 
develop private sector institutions that can help procure it.  Attempts to replace a 
malfunctioning state with a market solution, currently very much in vogue in certain 
quarters in the United States, will fail, as long as they do not recognize the distinctive 
problems inherent in securing decentralized cooperation.  
 
Governments in France and Germany have taken on a challenge for which the 
tools of past policymaking are inadequate.  The goal of creating cooperation among 
companies has not proven amenable to solution through either the raw exercise of state 
punitive power or the lavish but indiscriminate use of state spending.  Financial sanctions 
have been adopted in France, and periodically threatened in Germany, but the existence 
or threat of a training tax has not compelled companies to coordinate around a high-skill 
equilibrium.  Likewise, the numerous subsidies to which French and eastern German 
companies have easy access have largely led to the development of low-cost training 
schemes that are profitable for those companies in the short-term, but which fail to 
convince them to invest heavily over the long-term in the general skills of their 
workforces.  And that, after all, was the whole point of the training reforms. 
What these governments have discovered is that the policies requiring 
decentralized cooperation pose problems that states are ill-equipped to solve.  These 
policy problems share three core characteristics:  strategic interaction, multiple equilibria, 
and analytic uncertainty.  First, the policies aim to influence the strategic interaction of 
actors with potentially competing interests.  In itself, this characteristic is not overly 
restrictive:  many types of traditional regulation, such as anti-trust or competition 
policies, explicitly target private interaction and limit the negative consequences 
generated by such interaction.  But what the strategic element underlines is that 
individuals make choices dependent on the choices of other individuals, whereas a 
traditional policy for improving skills requires no strategic interaction.  Consider, for 
example, one of the most successful educational policies in American history:  the GI 
Bill.  This initiative radically lowered the costs for members of the armed services to 
attend institutions of higher education, and it consequently resulted in a massive increase 
in levels of educational certification.  But the GI Bill, as public policy, acted purely at the 
individual level:  the decision of one GI to take advantage of the program to attend 
college was completely independent of the choices of any other soldier to attend school.  
Not so in a problem of decentralized cooperation:  the French and German training 
reforms depended not on the choice of any one company to invest in apprenticeship, but Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  2 
   
on convincing a number of firms to move more or less simultaneously to invest in such 
training.  
The element of strategic interaction underlines the second, related feature of 
problems of decentralized cooperation:  that of coordinating behavior around one of 
several competing, plausible alternatives.  The problem of coordination arises when there 
are what game theorists call multiple equilibria; in other words, in situations where there 
are several jointly preferred possible outcomes around which actors can coordinate their 
behavior. A large and a small company may both prefer the adoption of some standard for 
skill certification, such that they can better assess the skill set of potential employees 
when hiring them.  Yet the large company prefers the standards defined by an association 
for large companies, whereas the small company prefers the standards set by a 
consortium of small employers.  Each company prefers the standards set by the other 
association over having no standard at all, but each would rather have its own standards 
than that of the other guy.  Depending on the strategies used, such a situation can result in 
the adoption of no standard, with the result that every company is then worse off.  This 
sort of situation, far from being unusual, is widespread:  “To achieve cooperation in a 
moderately complicated repeated game… it is necessary to make sure that all players 
arrive at the same expectations about which of many available equilibria they will adhere 
to.  Nearly any interesting problem with multiple equilibria is a coordination problem” 
(Calvert, 1995: 243).  One problem frequently posed by having a number of outcomes 
that are mutually preferable to other outcomes, as in the standard-setting example, is that 
they introduce distributive conflict (Scharpf, 1997).   
Such problems of coordination are further exacerbated by the uncertainty 
generated by reforms premised on securing coordinated behavior.  In the case of 
standard-setting, companies are at least able to predict with a high level of confidence 
what they gain from adopting each sort of certification system.  As we have seen through 
the experiences of managers in eastern Germany and in France, it is often very difficult 
for actors to estimate with any certainty what they stand to gain if a cooperative move is 
in fact met by cooperation.  The gains to apprenticeship training were not clearly 
apparent to some of the firms in my sample until, with the help of subsidies, they began 
investing in such training and retaining the young trainees as employees.  When cognitive Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  3 
   
unfamiliarity with an issue area is high, bounded rationality is likely to limit the 
predictive power of individual actors. When, on the contrary, results are easily 
predictable, there is no issue of analytic uncertainty.  Redistributive tax policies, for 
example, involve neither strategic interaction nor analytic uncertainty:  I have a pretty 
good idea what I will gain or lose from a change in the marginal tax rate, and my gain or 
loss is independent of what others do.  Nuclear politics is clearly strategic, but there is not 
much analytic uncertainty:  if my opponent launches his entire nuclear arsenal as a result 
of a perceived defection, the results are going to be predictably catastrophic.  
Decentralized cooperation combines both a strategic element with a degree of analytic 
uncertainty about the nature of the new payoffs to cooperation. 
These, then, are the summary elements of a policy area likely to engender 
problems of decentralized cooperation:  dependence on strategic interaction of numerous 
social actors; the existence of multiple potential, Pareto-improving solutions; and  a high 
degree of analytic uncertainty.  In what policy areas, specifically, are we most likely to 
observe such problems?  The first, as has been underlined throughout this book, is 
economic policy, especially economic policies aimed at the supply-side of the economy. 
Governments of both the left and right have conceded that their most viable route to 
influence the shape of the economy is by changing supply-side policies that influence the 
decision-making of individual companies (Boix, 1998; Garrett & Lange, 1991; Hall, 
1999).   Facilitating investment in human capital, diffusing results of research and 
development through technology transfer, and building SME incubation centers are areas 
that raise severe issues of decentralized cooperation.  In social policy, problems such as 
urban renewal—which depend on the coordination of investment decisions by 
companies, developers, and individuals—are also likely to be subject to this dynamic.  
Finally, diffuse environmental problems share these features.  They depend on the mutual 
exercise of restraint by different types of companies; there are often a bewildering 
number of potential solutions that improve the environment, but which have different 
distributive consequences; and the effects of any of these choices on a given actor is often 
highly uncertain (Mazmanian & Kraft, 1999; Sabel, Fung, & Karkkainen, 1999).  Later in 
this chapter I shall explore the applications of this framework to a case fraught with the Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  4 
   
problems characteristic of the politics of decentralized cooperation:  that of the 
Chesapeake Bay. 
The rise of policy problems like these has generated different dominant responses 
from governments in the industrialized countries.  In liberal market economies like the 
United States and the United Kingdom, the most prominent response has been the 
privatization of the functions of government, where possible, and the attempt to “reinvent 
government” along market models where it has not been feasible for the government to 
delegate its functions to a private body (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  This choice is not 
surprising, given that the market is usually the best functioning mechanism for 
coordination in these economies, but there are good reasons to think that the market is not 
the ideal way to help overcome problems of decentralized cooperation, which I will 
explore below.  The dominant strategy in the continental European countries, especially 
those with the institutions characteristic of coordinated market economies (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001), has been the negotiation of national social pacts (Hassel & Ebbinghaus, 
2000; Rhodes, 1998).  Such bargained pacts have offered apparent miracles of reversing 
unemployment and promoting economic growth by negotiating agreements between 
corporatist actors and the state (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997).  While these deals recall the 
corporatist pacts of the 1970s, the easy analogy between them is misleading.  In fact, as I 
show in the concluding section of this chapter, the contemporary politics of reform are 
not just (or even primarily) about exchange, but about finding a solution to tough 
problems which is both politically viable and technically workable.  In many cases, these 
are problems of decentralized cooperation. 
 
 
Private Organizations and Deliberation 
Policymakers attempting to secure decentralized cooperation are dogged by the 
uncertainty that these reforms engender.   The crux of the problem is that the individual 
actors being asked to change their existing patterns of cooperation know that they have 
not cooperated in the past, and they know that others know this.  Yet they have 
incomplete information about many other parameters of the situation created for them by 
new policies.  First, actors have the obvious question of strategic uncertainty:  how will Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  5 
   
those with whom I am interacting respond to these reforms?  Will they choose to 
cooperate if I cooperate, or will a cooperative overture be exploited?  Second, they are 
uncertain about the ability of either public policy or private associations to play the 
enabling roles posited for them by reformers.  Third, even if their cooperation is 
reciprocated, and even if the new infrastructural institutions work as advertised, actors 
may be skeptical whether or not this new pattern of cooperation is indeed likely to 
generate the benefits ascribed to it by policymakers.  We know that individuals tend to 
weigh the possibility of loss more heavily than the possibility of an equally probable gain 
from changing their patterns of interaction, which underlines the cognitive distortion that 
stands in the way of improving the prospects of social cooperation (Fernandez & Rodrik, 
1991).  Actors are not only biased against future loss, but also quite boundedly rational 
when it comes to evaluating the gains to be had from cooperation.  Unlike in the set-up in 
laboratory experiments, actors may genuinely be uncertain what will happen if they 
cooperate and their partner cooperates:  what is the new payoff?  This analytic 
uncertainty is an imposing barrier on the road to successfully building new patterns of 
cooperation. 
Analytic uncertainty constitutes a core characteristic of the politics of 
decentralized cooperation, and it is in situations characterized by such uncertainty that the 
framework I have developed should be applicable to other reforms besides those of 
French and German vocational training.  As I argued in the first chapter of this book, the 
elegant theoretical solution of sanctions lacks credibility when the sanctioning regime is 
part of the new institution that a government is attempting to establish.  And that is the 
first empirical prediction that emerges from this framework when confronting a situation 
of decentralized cooperation:  sanctions will be unsuccessful in extracting cooperation 
from private actors, because they will not be credible.  This creates the need for some 
other mechanism to persuade actors of the benefits of cooperation, and it increases the 
value of reliable information circulation (Calvert, 1995; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 
1994).  In the realm of the political economy, we can expect that the best candidate 
capable of playing this intermediary role is an employers’ association or a union.
1 
                                                 
1 In training policy, problems of employer coordination are paramount, and for that reason this book has 
focused on the coordinating capacity of employers’ associations.  Unions were less central to the problem Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  6 
   
The information to which a private association must have access is of two sorts:  
technical and relational.  The advantage of private interest groups in gathering technical 
information is not new.  Studies of the American policy process have underlined the 
informational strengths of interest groups, which can be routine patrollers of agency 
implementation that Congress cannot (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).  Likewise, those 
who have written about the advantages of corporatist governance have underlined the 
importance of the ability of groups to exercise such competence in assuming a role in 
policy implementation (Schmitter & Lehmbruch, 1979; Visser & Hemerijck, 1997).  This 
technical expertise is indeed a prerequisite to successful group action in promoting 
decentralized cooperation, but it is subordinate in importance to relational information.  
Relational information concerns the cooperative propensities of actors:  where do actors 
stand, in relation to other potential cooperators in the population, on the question of 
whether or not to cooperate?  Associations need to have access to this information in 
order to target the most likely cooperators in the population in their efforts of 
mobilization and persuasion.  The combination of technical and relational expertise 
allows these organizations to assist governments in designing aid that appeals 
disproportionately to the most likely cooperators in the population:  the waverers.  And 
convincing the waverers is the heart of the problem of decentralized cooperation. 
The analytic uncertainty that prevents waverers from cooperating is the major 
stumbling block to the emergence of decentralized cooperation.  For this reason, 
organizational capacity must extend beyond the mere circulation of information; it must 
include the ability to foster inter-firm deliberation.  The importance of deliberative 
capacity has been argued cogently by Hall and Soskice (2001), who point out that, faced 
with a problem of coordination, deliberative capacity helps actors settle on a focal point 
that is welfare-improving.
2  That is correct, as far as it goes.  Yet in order to understand 
why deliberative capacity is a prerequisite for securing decentralized cooperation, we 
                                                                                                                                                 
of coordination, although we saw that the strength of unions was quite important in imposing constraints on 
employer strategies in Germany, while much less so in France. 
 
2 As noted earlier, the difficulty created by many coordination problems is that different solutions improve 
the welfare of some actors more than of others; dealing with these sorts of distributive problems is why 
deliberative capacity is so important to the framework developed by Hall and Soskice (2001) (cf. Scharpf 
1997). 
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need to go beyond the insights of game theory to the realm of social psychology.  The 
barriers to cooperation that I have identified are cognitive:  a status quo bias combined 
with analytic uncertainty.  In other words, people are afraid of trying a cooperative 
arrangement because they have difficulty estimating its benefits accurately.  Being risk 
averse, they prefer to remain in a situation where they can benefit a little less, but where 
they know exactly what to expect.  Better the devil you know than the uncertain angel.  
How does the capacity of an organization to facilitate deliberation affect the biases of 
individual members toward caution?  
Successful organizations in this context can exploit a phenomenon known as 
group polarization.
3  Repeated experiments have shown that group interaction has the 
effect of amplifying the summation of individual opinions of members of the group.  The 
original experiment that led to this finding, since confirmed by follow-up studies in many 
diverse settings, is usefully illustrative.  Stoner (1961) posed to his individual subjects a 
number of hypothetical dilemmas like this one: “An electrical engineer may stick with his 
present job at modest but adequate salary, or may take a new job offering considerably 
more money but no long-term security.”  The results, as summarized in Brown (1988), 
were startling:   
The subjects were asked to judge the lowest acceptable level of risk for them to 
advise the main character in the scenario to give the riskier alternative a try….  
The subjects were then randomly formed into groups and asked to reach a 
unanimous decision on each of the dilemmas they had considered individually.  
Stoner found to his surprise that these group decisions were nearly always riskier 
than the average of the individual group member pre-discussion decisions.  These 
results were quickly replicated by Wallach et al. (1962), who also established that 
these shifts in group opinion became internalized because they reappeared when 
the subjects were asked once more for their individual opinions after the group 
discussion. 
 
This finding—that group opinions magnify the leanings of the individual group 
members—have been reinforced through studies across a variety of fields, from how 
juries decide to how individuals judge physical attractiveness (Brown, 1988; Lamm & 
Myers, 1978; Sunstein et al., 1998). 
                                                 
3 This literature came to my attention as the result of a paper presented by Cass Sunstein on the incoherence 
of jury judgments (cf. Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, 1998). 
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Deliberation, on its own, does not solve the primary ills of decentralized 
cooperation.  The finding of this literature is not that deliberation reduces perceptions of 
risk in all cases.  It is rather that the individual leanings of a group will be magnified 
through group deliberation.  So groups whose average opinion is risk-seeking will make 
their members even more risk-seeking, and risk-averse groups will tend to heighten their 
members’ risk aversion.  Employers’ associations—or organizations like them that serve 
similar functions in trying to secure decentralized cooperation—promote deliberation in 
two ways.  First, in their general meetings and standing committees they promote group 
deliberation, but these exchanges usually concern only the broad outlines of their 
strategy.  The key to polarizing actors in the right direction is to construct and promote 
deliberation among smaller sub-groups, whose members on average are likely to lean 
toward cooperation.  That is, eliminate the confirmed defectors from the mix, while 
concentrating the waverers together with existing cooperators.  This strategy, following 
the group polarization logic, is likely to promote a shift towards cooperation and away 
from defection, among the group of waverers.  In other words, a cooperative attitudinal 
shift (polarization) should take place. 
Why is that?  While this is a subject of dispute among social psychologists, the 
prevailing view is that the exchange of information and argument among the group is a 
driving force in producing this polarization of opinion.  Each member of the group has an 
argument or set of arguments for why he or she leans toward choosing cooperation.  But 
these arguments are not all the same.  As these participants exchange information and 
argument, those who are leaning toward cooperation discover (through this interaction) 
different arguments that confirm their pre-existing belief that cooperation is a strategy 
with long-term benefits (Brown, 1988; Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977).  Since this is a group 
that, by design, tends to lean towards cooperation, the balance of arguments circulating 
through the group will favor cooperation, and thus these opinions will be reinforced.
4  By 
stacking the deck with a set of waverers and existing cooperators, this group of 
                                                 
4 The principal alternative explanation of the process of group polarization is that social comparison takes 
place:  individuals observe within the group a preponderance of individuals sharing similar opinions, and 
are thereby reinforced in that belief that their views were correct (polarizing them).  Most versions of this 
explanation contend that social comparison acts in concert with the persuasion/information effect 
associated with Burnstein and Vinokur (1977).  Cf. Lamm and Myers (1978) and Brown (1988) for a 
further discussion. Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  9 
   
individuals is exposed to more arguments for cooperation than against it, and their prior 
leanings are strongly confirmed. 
In light of these findings, we can clearly see why the capacities of employers’ 
associations have been so crucial to the account of decentralized cooperation given here.  
First, associations have the relational information necessary to identify the most likely 
cooperators, and the technical expertise required to design a program that can attract 
these waverers disproportionately.  Second, they have the general capacity to develop 
such a strategy as a response to problems of cooperation, and they can promote 
information exchange and argumentation—i.e., deliberation—among the waverers that 
are attracted to begin participating.  And finally, their ability to exercise the foregoing 
capacities allows them effectively to mobilize potential waverers.  Knowing that the 
association has served as an effective forum for deliberation, the strategies adopted there 
acquire a certain legitimacy in the eyes of member firms, which can then be convinced to 
begin participating in cooperative arrangements.  Moreover, within the small sub-groups 
of waverers, the association is constantly involved by providing further arguments for 
why cooperation has its own rewards; in other words, the association pulls the group 
opinions toward cooperation.  For all these reasons, we can posit that the existence of an 
organization with capacities of information circulation, deliberation, and mobilization is 
the necessary condition to secure decentralized cooperation. 
 
The Role of Government 
  Although this argument is premised on the strong capacities of private 
organizations, it is not an argument for pure private interest governance (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Cohen & Rogers, 1992; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985).  Just as states 
need to develop private capacities in order to succeed in securing decentralized 
cooperation, private organizations will have difficulty financing experiments of 
cooperation on their own.  The literature on private interest governance is motivated by 
the twin claims of greater efficiency and greater democratic legitimacy when groups self-
regulate.  I share with this literature a strong claim of the informational advantages of 
groups vis-à-vis state regulators for detailed policymaking.  Where I diverge from it, 
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though, is in drawing attention to features of policy design that specifically target 
waverers in the population, and in the implicit assumption that the resources necessary to 
get cooperation started, where it has not previously existed, will require that the state not 
disengage entirely from the process. 
By way of contrast with the common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas studied by 
Elinor Ostrom (1990), organizational attempts to secure decentralized cooperation on 
their own are unlikely to succeed.  The benefits are often too diffuse (as they accrue to 
citizens across the polity), and the start-up costs are too high.  Ostrom’s actors generate 
their own solutions especially when not doing so would lead to a catastrophic outcome.  
This is the catalyst that gets them over the status quo bias.  The prospect of irretrievably 
losing a precious resource, like the prospect of death, concentrates the mind wonderfully.  
In situations of decentralized cooperation, though, failure is an option; it is possible to 
imagine muddling through with current conditions, even though general welfare would 
improve if decentralized cooperation could be secured. 
The difference in this strategic situation alters the credibility of sanctions and the 
role of the state.  Ostrom’s actors, faced with the possible exhaustion of common pool 
resources, develop institutional solutions that depend for their success on the existence of 
graduated sanctioning mechanisms (Ostrom, 1998).  If they have commonly 
acknowledged the problem and been involved in the design of these sanctions, they are 
likely to find the sanctions more credible than those accomplished in the wake of a state 
reform exhorting them to cooperate in the provision of a public good that does not 
currently exist.  In the class of cases investigated by Ostrom, the state is often considered 
an impediment to developing successful rules for self-governance.
5  But, in situations 
characterized by the politics of decentralized cooperation, the private actors are uncertain 
about how others will act, uncertain about the payoffs to cooperation even if it is 
requited, and they are skeptical that either the state or private associations will be able to 
develop enforcement mechanisms in this climate of uncertainty.  Paradoxically, even 
though the state is usually the enforcer of last resort, the fact that the new societal 
                                                 
5 “Once national or regional governmental officials indicate that they consider it their responsibility to 
solve CPR problems, one can expect local appropriators who do not already have local institutions in place 
to wait for the government to handle their problems.  If someone else agrees to pay the costs of supplying 
new institutions, it is difficult to overcome the temptation to free-ride” (Ostrom 1990: 213). Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  11 
   
equilibrium is a goal set by the state renders the possibility of effective sanctioning even 
more implausible, as the capacity to sanction requires a detailed understanding of the 
policy area in question (which, we have seen, the state does not generally have).  In the 
fisheries and forests studied by Ostrom, actors who themselves have local knowledge and 
exploit the common pool resource have set the rules, and these rules may consequently 
have more credibility.  But in the situations studied here, sanctions will not work, because 
they will be neither credible nor effective.  
Government is indispensable to the process of securing decentralized cooperation:  
it sets broad goals, limits organizational rent-seeking, and subsidizes experimental 
programs for convincing waverers. In almost all such cases, the most effective way for 
the state to intervene is to pay some of the start-up costs of waverers.  To be effective, the 
state must structure its programs to attract waverers, not those who are unlikely to be 
convinced of the long-term merits of cooperation.  Only if the state can design policies 
that attract a large enough proportion of waverers, and allow them to convince each other 
of the benefits to cooperation, will the behavior be able eventually to spread in the 
population; otherwise it will fizzle.  And only states that design policy using insights 
available through private information—whether gleaned through collaboration with 
private associations or through some functional equivalent thereto—will be able to target 
policies to attract waverers.  Conversely, state policy uninformed by private information 
will be targeted only at characteristics the state can easily measure, and these efforts will 
not be effective at attracting waverers disproportionately.  They are, therefore, destined to 
fail in securing decentralized cooperation. 
 
 
From the Economy to the Environment 
  The difficulties inherent in securing decentralized cooperation have been on vivid 
display in the contemporary reforms of vocational education and training undertaken in 
France and eastern Germany.  As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, the majority of 
companies that are subsidized to train apprentices in both economies do not appear to be 
making the heavy investment in transferable general skills that is the most enviable 
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quality of the western German apprenticeship system.  These states are pouring millions 
of dollars per year into subsidies that are, in the main, failing to elicit high-skill training 
behavior.  This is particularly true in France, where very large firms are eligible for 
training subsidies despite the fact that their preference orderings make it extremely 
unlikely that they will ever be convinced of the merits of investing in transferable skills.  
They are content to let the state provide transferable skills through the system of general 
education, and then to provide firm-specific training to employees as necessary.  Large 
firms in eastern Germany are far more likely to be investing heavily in transferable skills 
training, and far less likely to be taking state subsidies to do so, than any other group of 
firms in my sample.  They have product market strategies whose continued success 
depends on the availability of the sort of skills supplied by high-level investment in 
training, and they have received financial and technical support from the western German 
conglomerates that are usually their owners.  For opposing reasons, then, the waverers are 
not to be found among large firms in the two economies:  large eastern German firms are 
usually existing cooperators, and large French firms are confirmed defectors.  Yet these 
large firms constitute a minority of potential training places in either economy; the fate of 
both reforms thus hangs on the action of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
  The waverers in the two populations are to be found among the SMEs, but 
national and regional governments lack the capacity to identify the waverers and design 
policies that can attract them disproportionately.  The story of Chapters Four and Five 
was how employers in some areas used public policy to overcome these difficulties, 
while others did not.  In eastern Germany, the two states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt 
adopted very different policy proposals to elicit investment in apprenticeship training, 
and these results are apparent in the behavior of companies training in these states.  As I 
showed in Chapters One and Four, this difference could be attributed neither to 
differences in social capital, nor to different capacities of employers’ organizations, since 
the states do not vary on these dimensions.  What differentiates the two is the way in 
which policy was designed:  in Saxony, the state government institutionalized the 
involvement of private actors in the process of policy design, while in Saxony-Anhalt the 
input of employers and unions was largely ignored.  As a result, the Saxon state 
government adopted a policy program that has been more effective than any other eastern Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  13 
   
German subsidy policy in convincing companies to mimic the training behavior of 
western German companies.  In Saxony-Anhalt, where policies have been designed only 
in light of the government’s informational resources, state policies have been 
unsuccessful in securing decentralized cooperation among companies. 
 The  Saxon  Verbund policy concentrated groups of wavering firms together in a 
training alliance, often using a large firm committed to high-skill training as the central 
node of the alliance.  The Verbund targeted the particular concerns of waverers:  the high-
costs of training in the first year and the quality of the broad training received during this 
year.  And in the process of doing so, it brought waverers together with each other over 
the three year life of an apprenticeship contract to persuade each other of the value of the 
training investment that each had made.  Among this small group, the choice to cooperate 
seemed not an implausibly high risk, but a reasonable investment in the long-term skill 
prospects of the company.  Inter-firm deliberation and experience with the infrastructural 
institutions of the training system allowed these companies to overcome their status quo 
bias and their analytic uncertainty about the value of cooperation. 
  In France, employers’ associations generally lack the organizational capacity to 
collect this information and design policies that will specifically appeal to the most likely 
cooperators in the population.  The institutions developed to enable regional governments 
to take over responsibility for youth training have repeatedly stumbled over the 
informational obstacles constituted by weak employers and unions.  Without access to 
good information from these private organizations, the regional governments have only 
been able to develop policies based on publicly available information, and these policies 
are incapable of disproportionately attracting the waverers in the population.  The 
national government has remained deeply implicated in the provision of in-firm training 
subsidies, but it is even further removed than the regional governments from the private 
information necessary to develop policies that effectively facilitate cooperation among 
companies.  Thus it has offered subsidies that are available to any company that wants to 
train, regardless of its likelihood of investing heavily in training in the long-term. 
  In the one area in which we observe success in France, an employers’ 
organization has used these indiscriminate subsidies to finance its own program for 
subsidizing the risk of waverers who experiment with cooperative training practices.  In Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  14 
   
this case private information has directed the application of public policy, such that 
indiscriminate subsidies can effectively discriminate between potential cooperators and 
confirmed defectors.  In the Valley of the Arve, employers first turned to the state to 
provide some sort of sanctioning capacity, since the association was unable to play this 
function on its own.  The state was unable to create an effective sanctioning mechanism 
to prevent poaching among companies, yet the association in the Arve nevertheless 
managed to frustrate the grim predictions of game theorists by convincing wavering 
companies to experiment with high-skill training, despite the lack of sanctions against 
poaching behavior.  These companies, brought together in the context of their repeated 
interaction through the courses of their trainees, persuaded each other of the wisdom of 
the training system even as they gained confidence in the ability of the system to deliver 
workers of high qualification levels. 
The French and German cases underscore the importance of information and of 
deliberation in securing decentralized cooperation.  But will these general lessons have 
wider empirical purchase?  I have claimed that the informational limits of states are 
endemic to many of the supply-side economic policies currently in vogue across the 
OECD.  National governments are not omniscient, and much of the information 
necessary to develop effective policies promoting human capital formation or facilitating 
technology transfer resides with the actors who will be involved in making those 
individual choices.  Thus, states that want to develop effective policies will be tempted to 
tap into these informational resources to overcome their own limited knowledge.  
Weber’s dictum about the “overtowering” knowledge advantage of the bureaucrat over 
the ruler has now been revised in favor of the private actors (and their interest 
associations) vis-à-vis the government.  Moreover, just as the informational advantage of 
the bureaucrat is diminishing, so too is the usefulness of the coercive power of the 
Weberian state.  Given the sorts of uncertainty engendered by these reforms, sanctioning 
is frequently an instrument without credibility for securing decentralized cooperation.    
Faced with the simultaneous weakening of its two traditional strengths, governments will 
be forced to develop innovative new strategies in order to succeed in their legislative 
goals. Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  15 
   
The problems of securing decentralized cooperation are not likely to be restricted 
to the political economy, although that is probably where they will be most prevalent.  
Political economies, and particularly European political economies, have seen the 
emergence over the past century of a variety of exotic bargaining regimes to balance the 
competing demands of capital and labor.  Yet even states without such arrangements, in 
policy areas outside the political economy, will have to face the challenges of procuring 
the cooperation of private actors with one another.  One such area is environmental 
regulation, which is typically viewed as an area of pure state regulation, in which the 
state steps in to limit the negative externalities that individual rationality often motivates 
firms to generate.
6  However, as I shall demonstrate through the initiative of the 
Chesapeake Bay Program, the problems identified above for areas of economic 
policymaking are now relevant to multiple environmental initiatives (cf. Sabel et al., 
1999).
7  And this in the context of the American liberal market economy, in which 
institutionalized negotiation has a smaller role in general than in the European cases 
studied up to this point. While the value of the case is purely illustrative, it does increase 
our confidence that these findings will travel.  
 
Chesapeake Bay Program 
[T]he Chesapeake Bay represents the antithesis of a traditional environmental 
problem, and offers a view of the environmental challenges that will arise in other 
venues in the next century.  There is no single polluting industry that can be fined 
or shut down, no single resource, like water, that can be targeted for regulatory 
action.  Nor will the problem be solved by a massive infusion of government 
dollars (Stranahan, 1993: 298). 
 
Environmental regulation in the industrialized states has in the past been a policy 
area in which governments adopt laws then establish an agency to enforce the rules.  The 
Chesapeake Bay Program (CBP) resulted from the governmental acknowledgment that 
                                                 
6 Which is not to say that polluters and the victims of pollution have not often met around the bargaining 
table.  However, they traditionally do so episodically in order to influence the decisions of the state agency 
regulating the question at hand. 
 
7 My attention was drawn to this case by a stimulating article by Sabel, Fung, and Karkainnen (1999), in 
which they make a broader argument about the development of “rolling rule regimes” in American 
environmental regulation.  Thanks to Archon Fung for discussions of this case. 
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such an approach would not succeed in repairing the degradation inflicted by various 
forms of pollution on the largest estuary in the United States.  The CBP was born in 1983 
of an agreement among the three most affected states (Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania), 
the District of Columbia, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which 
followed a seven year study of the problems of the marine ecosystem.  It represented a 
novel, consensus-based central governance mechanism that brought together state and 
federal representatives in on-going consultation and goal-setting, and the group in 1987 
produced a document establishing specific guidelines for meeting the broad objectives set 
four years earlier.  The most notable specific goal of the 1987 agreement was that of 
reducing the load of phosphorous and nitrogen in the bay and its tributaries by 40 percent 
by the year 2000.  While the consensual inter-state and inter-agency pact used to generate 
the specific recommendations is unusual, the initial goal-setting could be seen as a simple 
variation of past means of regulation, tailored to the problems of an ecosystem that cuts 
across several different jurisdictions.  What defines the Chesapeake program as a policy 
problem of decentralized cooperation is the strategic situation and analytic uncertainty it 
has created. 
In the wake of the 1987 agreement, the state governments did what states do best:  
they regulated the sources of pollution, e.g., banning the sale of laundry detergents 
containing phosphates and improving the methods used by sewage treatment plants 
(Davison & al, 1997).   Such offenders were relatively easy to identify and to take action 
against; yet the slow progress in nutrient reduction after 1987 drew increasing attention to 
sources of non-point pollution, especially run-off from farms.  Point sources of pollution 
are pipes that discharge nutrients directly into the bay, such as sewage plants.  States can 
regulate point pollution easily enough, because they merely have to know where the pipes 
are, monitor their discharge, and impose sanctions for excessive pollution.  Non-point 
pollution refers to run-off from storms:  rain washes nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorous) off 
the lands of farms, which then seeps into streams or the water table.
8  This makes non-
point pollution difficult to measure and ipso facto difficult to regulate, because the efforts 
to enlist farmers to reduce such pollution are voluntary:  in Maryland, for example, they 
                                                 
8 In 1996, 66 percent of the phosphorous and 57 percent of the pollution to the Chesapeake Bay came from 
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generally involve state subsidies for farmers to install best management practices, 
including the elaboration of nutrient management plan.  However, the state does not 
verify whether or not farmers are actually implementing the nutrient plans ((CBP), 1994; 
Davison & al, 1997).  In order for the goals of the Chesapeake Bay Program to be 
reached, the state governments must convince farmers and property developers to agree 
to cooperate with the goals of the program, even though the states possess no feasible 
way to measure individual compliance, nor a means to compel it. 
The key group for dealing with non-point pollution is farmers, since the runoff 
comes from their land.  What is the character of strategic interaction here?  The farmers 
living on bay tributaries view their land as their principal asset, one whose long-term 
value is strongly determined by the local environment (Paolisso & Maloney, 2000).  The 
action of any one farmer to limit his or her runoff will only have an aggregate effect if 
most farmers agree to limit their runoff; but limiting runoff is costly, and no one is sure 
what the others will do.  If a farmer invests in a nutrient management plan while no other 
farmer does so, then he receives the worst possible outcome:   he pays but gets no benefit 
to the environment.  But each farmer would prefer that the majority of farms invest in 
nutrient management plans.  While farmers are not the only actors in this dilemma, their 
position is central.  There are environmentalists, government officials, and fishermen on 
one side, while developers and industries stand on the other.  The first group of actors is 
highly concerned with decreasing the pollution in the bay, while the second group stands 
to gain from minimal regulation of pollution in the bay, at least in the short-term.
9  Thus, 
the problems of strategic interaction are concentrated among farmers, and it is among 
them that the waverers are likely to be found. 
Analytic uncertainty compounds the cooperative dilemma facing farmers and 
other actors in the Chesapeake, as they are not certain how to estimate the costs nor the 
benefits of a nutrient management plan:  
                                                 
9 A study of the attitudes of farmers in the Chesapeake Bay region confirms that they see their interests as 
distinct from both industry and environmental officials.  “I think by and large a lot of big businesses, their 
motive is profit.  And whatever they have to do to always show a profit[, they will….  Their attitude is] to 
hell with [the] environment.”  On the other hand, farmers view environmentalists as unaware of the 
compromises that are necessary to reconcile a healthy environment with productive farming (Paolisso and 
Maloney 2000).  
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the day is likely coming when the tributary strategies become final and the full 
costs of making the necessary investments is realized.  Even then, the cost picture 
is very confused: a farmer may actually save money from reduced fertilizer and 
pesticide purchases; a developer may be able to tout settling ponds and wetlands 
as community amenities; an industry may save from a pollution prevention 
measure (Matuszeski, 1995). 
 
Given the complexity of the strategic interaction among the different stakeholders in the 
Bay, it is hardly surprising that farmers are not at all clear what they will gain and what 
they will lose if they restrain pollution from agricultural runoff, even if other farmers also 
cooperate. 
As predicted by my explanatory framework, the states involved in the CBP have 
found that the tools they try to use to limit non-point pollution—i.e., their sanctions—
have been ineffective, faced with the lack of information available to those states and 
their difficulty enforcing measures.  Indicative of this phenomenon was the passage by 
the Maryland state legislature, immediately after the signature of the 1983 agreement, of 
the Critical Area Protection Act, which established stringent controls of the one-
thousand-foot strips of land bordering the bay.  The measure enraged landowners and 
developers, who consequently sought and received numerous exemptions and grandfather 
clauses, which vitiated much of force of the legislation (Davison & al, 1997: 205).  While 
the program has undeniably driven up the price of land in the area, the pressure to 
develop it continues, and local governments have been lax in enforcing the provisions 
against developers (Macdonald, 1997).  As the credibility of these measures declines, 
given the numerous exemptions and haphazard enforcement, they have lost their ability 
to convince non-point polluters to cooperate, since the risk of punishment is so low. 
It was about the time of the passage of the critical areas act that the states 
involved in the CBP began to recognize they lacked the fine-grained information 
necessary to undertake detailed policy analysis and to overcome the obstacles that 
prevented individual actors from cooperating.  A citizen monitoring program, founded in 
1985, allowed residents to combine their local knowledge of the waterways with the 
technical expertise available to the government in order to monitor water quality 
throughout the bay’s tributaries (Hudson, 1995).  It was the availability of these data, 
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shift in 1992 to a “tributary strategy”: rather than attacking the central stem of the bay, 
the CBP would encourage the development of local solutions that could focus on the 
specific problems of individual tributaries (Matuszeski, 1995; Sabel et al., 1999).  There 
were no obvious interest group interlocutors that possessed the necessary organizational 
capacities of information-circulation and deliberation, so the CBP assembled Tributary 
Teams, comprising local citizens, farmers, business representatives and government 
officials (Macdonald 1997).  Lacking associational conduits to the private information 
that was required to enable the CBP to encourage the development of local cooperation, 
the state put together fora in which  its technical expertise could be informed by the local, 
relational knowledge of private citizens.  
The Tributary Teams not only collected information that the state was unable to 
collect; they also used this information to foster the development of strategies to convince 
wavering cooperators in the population:  most notably, farmers. The Chesapeake Bay 
Trust established grants to facilitate the local projects of the Teams, giving priority to 
“education projects that promote a behavior change toward the bay” (Monitor, 1997).
10  
One notable example of the effort of Tributary Teams to help persuade potential 
cooperators is the case of the Maryland cover crop incentive program.  Recall that non-
point pollution is principally a product of run-off of nutrients from farm fields when it 
rains; winter cover crops diminish this threat by absorbing nitrogen in the soil, so that it 
cannot then be washed into bay tributaries.  Despite the existence of state subsidy 
programs to support the planting of winter cover crops, farmers have not flocked to this 
program.  Maryland’s eastern shore contains a particularly high density of farms, and the 
three eastern shore Tributary Teams had begun by the summer of 1996 to gather 
information about the barriers to using cover crops.  One of the obstacles commonly 
encountered by farmers was a lack of time and labor to plant cover crops, so the Upper 
Eastern Shore Team, together with university and Farm Bureau representatives, solicited 
government assistance in 1997 to underwrite an aerial seeding project to “address major 
barriers to the adoption of cover crops on a wide-scale, and to heighten awareness of their 
benefits in the prevalent crop rotations in the Upper Eastern Shore.”  This problem is 
                                                 
10 In other words, to target waverers. 
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particularly acute in drought years, and the project hoped to provide concrete 
demonstration benefits of the program even during such a time by subsidizing the 
participation of 25 local farms in the area (Starkey 1997).  Note the similarity with the 
eastern German Verbund policy discussed in Chapter Four:  this program would bring 
wavering cooperators together to experiment with a cooperative venture, but subsidizing 
them so as to cover the risk of potential loss.
11  The Tributary Teams of Maryland’s 
eastern shore were quite aware of the reluctance of farmers to participate in the winter 
cover crop plan, and they pursued a remedy that would get state support for many of 
those farmers while stimulating the exchange of information among a group of farmers 
likely to be persuaded of the long-term value of cooperation. 
  Tributary Teams constituted solely from the ranks of environmental groups would 
have had little effect on the behavior of sources of non-point polluters like farmers, 
because environmentalists clearly have a stated interest in cleaning up the bay as quickly 
and thoroughly as possible.  Developing the Tributary Teams as a forum for deliberation 
among farmers and environmentalists had the advantage of improving information 
exchange among actors with a professed aim to improve the environment of the bay 
(Paolisso and Maloney 2000).  The joint action of these teams established a setting in 
which these actors could learn about the effects of various steps to reduce the 
environmental dangers to the Chesapeake—a shared goal—while off-setting some of the 
costs involved.  Daniel Fiorino (1999), the director of the Emerging Strategies Division at 
the EPA, lauds the new strategy of the CBP, noting that the inability of national 
regulation to resolve issues of non-point pollution in the Chesapeake “provided ample 
room for the emergence of an adaptive, flexible, learning-based approach to the 
problem”.
12  While there is certainly a continued role for tradition regulation of 
                                                 
11 The cover crop program focuses on bringing multiple local farmers into the project, where they could 
learn from each other as well as from their own experiences.  This approach contrasts sharply with much 
more long-running programs whose findings are less likely to influence the choices of farmers because they 
are not widely known, and they do not promote deliberation among a group of local actors  (e.g., Staver & 
Brinsfield, 1996)).  A 1996 survey of 1600 farm operators by the Maryland Department of Agriculture 
found that, among those farms that had not taken part in the subsidy program for winter cover crops, 58 
percent cited ‘lack of information about the program’ as their reason for not participating (Monitor 1997). 
  
12 As noted in the most recent report on the state of the bay, “the major source of non-point loading 
reductions for nitrogen and phosphorous anticipated by 2000 will come from those Chesapeake basins with 
tributary strategies in place (CBP 1999: 27).  Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  21 
   
environmental pollution, it appears that environmental policy requiring the interaction of 
local and national actors may be as susceptible as the political economy to the attractions 
of the politics of decentralized cooperation.  
  If traditional regulation is not up to coping with the complexity of the clean-up of 
the Chesapeake Bay, would a simple system of private interest governance not suffice?  
Are the elaborate deliberative mechanisms of the Tributary Teams really required?  The 
evidence from the favored example of multi-jurisdictional private interest governance in 
the United States suggests not.  The US chemical industry’s Responsible Care Program is 
a project of industrial self-regulation in which the Chemical Manufacturer’s Association 
(CMA) has adopted a code of environmental, health, and safety principles to which its 
member firms are supposed to adhere.  But in point of fact, adherence to the principles of 
the code has been varied, with members especially likely to implement only the codes in 
those areas visible to outsiders (Howard, Nash, & Ehrenfeld, 2000).  The scheme has no 
explicit sanctioning mechanism for defection, and it “has fallen victim to enough 
opportunism that it includes a disproportionate number of poor performers, and its 
members do not improve faster than non-members” (King & Lenox, Forthcoming).
13  
Moreover, since 1990, the composition  of its membership has not changed:  larger and 
more visible companies are much more likely to participate (King & Lenox, 
Forthcoming).  These large, visible companies are probably those that least need to be 
convinced of following these practices—in other words, this program is not reaching the 
waverers, but only the confirmed cooperators.  Responsible Care, with neither a 
functioning sanctioning mechanism nor a program of disproportionately attracting the 
waverers in the population, shows the limits of pure private interest governance not 
somehow articulated with public regulation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13 As Scharpf (1997) has noted, private interest governance often works well only when operating “in the 
shadow of the state;” that is, when state sanctioning is present and credible. 
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States, Coordination, and Public Policy 
  How do we expect the organization of political economies to affect the incidence 
and success of policies premised on securing decentralized cooperation?  The analytic 
approach adopted here is strongly informed by the literature on the “varieties of 
capitalism,” and the findings of this book reinforce the importance of viewing 
coordination as an issue of central importance in understanding how actors in the political 
economy respond to public policy (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, & 
Stephens, 1999).  The distinction between liberal market economies and coordinated 
market economies turns on the mechanisms by which actors within the political 
economy—pre-eminently, business firms—coordinate their actions with each other.  
Information circulation and deliberative capacity are especially important components of 
stabilizing behavior around a given equilibrium, since how firms react to any given 
market signal depends on how they think other firms will react to that same signal.  By 
focusing on the ways in which institutions work in concert, the varieties of capitalism 
approach specifies plausible micro-foundations to its support its main theoretical claims.  
The core argument is that there exist two groups of institutionally self-reinforcing 
equilibria in the advanced capitalist countries, each with its preferred mode of 
coordination:  primarily free markets in the liberal market economies (LMEs), and 
primarily non-market coordination in the coordinated market economies (CMEs).  Thus 
we understand why market “rigidities” like wage bargaining have been largely 
suppressed in one set of economies while only modified slightly in others (Iversen, 1999; 
Soskice, 1999).  In both its theoretical focus on coordination and its empirical 
concentration on companies, this book embraces some of the principal tenets of the 
varieties of capitalism approach. 
There is, however, an important distinction to be made with that approach, and it 
has to do with the principal flaw in the framework of comparative institutional advantage:  
namely, its difficulty in dealing with political change.  Given the strongly self-reinforcing 
nature of the two equilibria among market economies, it is very difficult to see how 
governments can ever hope to create non-market coordination when they do not already 
possess it.  Liberal market economies rely on the market, and coordinated market 
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achieved allow for different institutional advantages.  This theoretical approach leads to 
an ideal-typical arrangement in which there are two existing equilibria toward which 
political economies tend, and movement away from these equilibria is posited to be 
extremely difficult (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Wood, 2001). Holding other things equal, it is 
true that the pre-existing organizational structures of an economy make some political 
economies (the CMEs) more conducive than others (the LMEs) to meeting the challenges 
posed by the politics of decentralized cooperation.  This is a proposition supported by the 
evidence from eastern Germany, where the assistance of western German associations 
was crucial in developing the organizational capacity of employers.  In spite of all the 
problems created by the transition to capitalism in eastern Germany, the successful 
establishment of strong employer organizations provides governments there with a large 
advantage in resolving problems of decentralized cooperation.  
Yet it does not follow from my research that change is impossible, even in 
economies that have not been absorbed into the framework of a coordinated market 
economy, as was eastern Germany.  The varieties of capitalism approach is ultimately too 
static.  The success achieved in the Valley of the Arve undercuts any deterministic theory 
that would claim that France is doomed to failure in creating non-market coordination 
because it is not already classified as a coordinated market economy.  In terms of the 
private organizations that could facilitate coordination, it is true that France finds itself in 
a uniquely bad situation:  it lacks the organizational capacities of a coordinated market 
economy, but it nevertheless has a set of entrenched private sector organizations engaged 
in bitter competition with each other.  This is not a new situation in France, nor is it one 
peculiar to vocational training (Howell, 1992; Levy, 1999).  But our focus on the 
determinants of company interests and group capacity suggests some positive lessons for 
the French state, as it tries to develop a stronger coordinating capacity among private 
organizations. 
On the one hand, the relatively weak coordinating capacity of employers’ 
organizations in France implies that policies that do not depend on decentralized 
cooperation have a better chance of being successful than do those that depend on solving 
the cooperative problems inherent in apprenticeship training.  For instance, the adoption 
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suggestive of the sort of policies that are more likely to succeed in France.  These degrees 
use the general education system to provide transferable skills that are perceived by 
companies to be useful in the production process.  These sorts of degrees are still subject 
to the problems of general education, in that they are likely to be further removed from 
the companies that actually use them (cf. Lynch, 1992).  But they can be used to increase 
the skill levels of the workforce without having to overcome the cooperative problems 
encountered in firm-based youth training. 
On the other hand, there are some strategies that may enable the French 
government actually to improve the chances of success of future reforms that require 
decentralized cooperation.  First, national and regional governments need to work on 
convincing at least some large firms of the potential benefits of cooperation.  Large 
employers dominate the employers’ associations, and as long as they do not perceive a 
self-interest in developing the capacity of the major sectoral organizations, these 
organizations will be slow in acquiring these capacities of deliberation and mobilization.  
Some large firms have provided collective goods to their suppliers in a certain number of 
areas (Hancké, 2001); if the state can convince these companies to push for the 
development of these capacities through their associations, the likelihood of success in 
securing decentralized cooperation will increase. 
The second thing national and regional governments can do is to shift the 
emphasis of French subsidy policies.  Indiscriminate subsidies to companies for hiring 
trainees are ineffective.  This effort can be redirected to underwrite experimental 
programs—like “1000 Technicians” in the Arve—and then try to diffuse information 
about these programs to other associational actors in the economy.  We have seen already 
that the state, because of its informational weaknesses, will have difficulty identifying the 
most successful programs a priori.  However, by setting common performance criteria, it 
can assess over time which programs are working, and it can help circulate this 
information among other associations.  What this suggests is that the French national and 
regional governments need to encourage experimentation among private groups, rather 
than trying to be more directive in setting policies.  While this process is both costly and 
slow, we have seen already that the expensive, indiscriminate subsidies of the national 
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information about how other programs are working, they may initiate discussion among 
their members to strengthen the capacity of the organization to deliver collective goods.  
This solution lacks Cartesian elegance, but given the informational limits of the state, this 
sort of approach offers the best way—an experimental, resolutely empirical way—to 
allow organizations to learn from each other, and the state to learn from them.
14 
The French case demonstrates another weakness of the varieties of capitalism 
approach, this one born of functionalism:  the axiom that each type of political economy 
must evolve mechanisms to generate coordination.  France corresponds neither to the 
ideal-type of the LME nor of the CME.  This has led analysts like David Soskice to 
explain how (the functional imperative of) coordination is provided in France by the state 
or by state-created networks of elites (Hancké & Soskice, 1996; Schmidt, 2000).  French 
firms, along with those firms in the rest of Europe, are currently shrugging off the weak 
growth of the past decade and are vigorous competitors in international markets, 
including many of the areas of the so-called new economy.  Thus, the reasoning runs, 
there must be something allowing French firms to reduce the uncertainty of their 
environment and to make credible commitments to one another.  The state and its 
technocratic elite are still more heavily involved in the economy than in other advanced 
economies, so the state seems the most likely provider of coordination. 
  Rather than assuming that there must be some sort of invisible coordinating force 
that is enabling this outcome to happen, the French case suggests that coordination, like 
neocorporatism and the strong state/weak state debate before it, is not the single 
Archimedean lever by which political economists can finally see the world clearly.
15  
Future research needs to explore cases like these more thoroughly to get good empirical 
evidence on the ways in which companies adapt to economic changes, bearing in mind 
that at any given moment, political economies may not be characterized by a perfect 
                                                 
14 This strategy of state-facilitated learning is similar to the deliberative democratic institutional 
architecture proposed by Charles Sabel and Archon Fung, and my thinking has been influenced by their 
work (cf. Sabel et al. 1999). 
Such an empirical approach to policymaking will of course run against the grain of conventional French 
thinking on the role of the state, as illustrated by the comments ascribed to a French diplomat on  the way 
in which European organizations interact:  “It will work in practice, yes.  But will it work in theory?” x. 
 
15 As Stanley Hoffmann has remarked, France is the graveyard of all theories. 
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equilibrium of expectations among micro-level agents.  How mutual expectations are 
formed and change in a world that is itself changing quickly is a question on which we 
need more data, not more assumptions. 
 
Negotiated Reforms in Coordinated Market Economies 
  Coordinated market economies like the German one seem well-placed to cope 
with policies premised on securing decentralized cooperation.  In comparison with liberal 
market economies, they are.  Yet the strong capacity of employers and of unions is a 
double-edged sword for the coordinated market economies.  While those organizations 
may possess the information-circulation and deliberative capacities necessary to succeed 
in targeting waverers, they may choose not to do so if it threatens their established bases 
of power within the political economy.  In other words, the power and autonomy of 
interest groups in coordinated market economies also allows them to insulate themselves 
from pressures for reform (Hassel & Ebbinghaus, 2000).  Once entrenched in power, they 
may find little reason to deviate from their established position, which means the state is 
without a viable partner for implementing the reforms.  The problems facing CMEs 
therefore result more from the strength of their organizations of private interest 
governance than from their weakness.  As Visser and Hemerijck (1997) and Katzenstein 
(1987) have noted, along with many others, the ubiquity of corporatist decision-making 
structures in many CMEs facilitates stalemate if there is an unhappy social partner who 
wants to block social change. 
  Scholars who have recently addressed the question of how to secure reform in 
economies like these have stressed the ability of states to put pressure on private interest 
groups to negotiate social pacts as the basis of institutional reforms (Ebbinghaus & 
Hassel, 2000; Rhodes, 1998).  The danger in this approach is to read into current national 
bargains the renewal of corporatist concertation of the 1970s.  As Marino Regini  has 
underlined, the deals that resulted from the negotiated reforms of the 1990s were 
motivated not by the logic of exchange, but instead by a logic of problem-solving:  “What 
the recent [Italian] negotiations over collective bargaining procedures, incomes policies 
and pension reform have involved is the devolution of policy-making functions to 
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redistributive policies” (Regini, 1997: 268).  There was no real secret to exercising wage 
restraint in the hey-day of corporatist exchange:  unions traded off exclusive 
representational rights—thus insulating them from membership discontent—for wage 
moderation and few strikes (Goldthorpe, 1984; Schmitter, 1974).  By contrast, 
developing and implementing solutions to contemporary problems of policymaking 
requires that organizations use their access to private information.  And organizations are 
only well-suited to deliver such information when they have the grassroots capacity to 
deliberate over possible alternatives and to craft a compromise viewed as legitimate by 
members.  In the neocorporatist bargain, unions delivered their members; now, they (or 
employers’ organizations) deliver information from their members, as well as acceptance 
of the policy reform.  They do that not by having monopoly power at the national level, 
but by having capable sub-national organizations that can circulate information among 
members, facilitate deliberation among them, and then mobilize them in favor of a 
chosen compromise. 
  The difference in micro-logics between the traditional neocorporatist wage 
bargain and the concertational reforms studied here reveals a problem with those analyses 
that stress the importance of the “shadow of the state” in convincing the social partners to 
compromise in reforms of the political economy (Hassel & Ebbinghaus, 2000).  
Ebbiginhaus and Hassell (2000) have developed a “Goldilocks” theory of concertational 
exchange, in which unions must be neither too strong (as in Germany) nor too weak (as 
in France), in order for concertational reforms to succeed.
16  Where unions are too 
strongly embedded in the workplace, as in Germany or Sweden, they can insulate 
themselves from the pressures for reform and refuse to come to the bargaining table.  
Weak unions, like those in France, are simply unable to negotiate reliably with the state.  
Where states can credibly threaten to intervene—as was the case in Italy and 
Netherlands—this potential intervention is said to be enough to compel social partners to 
engage in negotiation over reforms to the welfare state or the wage bargaining system.  
Yet if the deliberative capacity of organization is as crucial as I have argued it is for the 
                                                 
16 The term “Goldilocks” theory is one I ascribe to their work, with reference to the eponymous actor’s 
culinary preferences at the house of the three bears.  She wanted the porridge not too hot, and not too cold, 
but just right. 
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successful implementation of reforms aimed at securing decentralized cooperation, the 
strength of unions and employers’ associations is a resource for reform, rather than a 
barrier.  The unstated assumption in this work is that government, either through 
bureaucrats or through politicians, carries reforming ideas, and that interest groups block 
them.  This assumption is often wrong. 
  The underlying theme of this book is that states only have access to certain kinds 
of information, and the information to which they have access is not the sort necessary to 
enable reforms to succeed.  States can define the broad ends of policy, but the move away 
from redistributive toward regulatory policymaking asks states to do what they are worst 
at doing:  problem-solve.  Governments are great standardizers, and they can collect an 
impressive amount of easily measurable and observable data about the polities they 
govern (Scott, 1998).  But they are not good at dealing with the idiosyncrasies of local 
knowledge, nor do they have access to reliable information about the cooperative 
propensities of individuals.  These are the sorts of information that appear to be of 
paramount importance in securing decentralized cooperation:  local knowledge because 
of the importance of responding to locally salient problems, and relational knowledge for 
using that local knowledge to attract the most likely cooperators in the population.  To 
develop solutions based on this sort of information, states need to work with private 
groups, because states themselves have trouble getting this information. 
  The idea of a coercive state imposing solutions on recalcitrant social partners 
loses some of its appeal when the social partners are the only ones that have the 
information the state needs to problem-solve effectively.  The coercive state has 
accomplished many things in the past century—many of them not altogether desirable—
but states cannot effectively coerce cooperation.  To the extent that states need to rely on 
private information to develop solutions, then, the “shadow of the state” is a relatively 
empty threat in forcing bargaining partners to capitulate in reforms of economic, social, 
or environmental policy.  Given that the ability of these organizations to overcome 
collective action problems is one of the institutional comparative advantages of the 
CMEs, such a strategy amounts to closing off the most promising avenue of reform. If 
this book is right to underline the rising importance of information for designing context-Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  29 
   
appropriate policy solutions, then reform in CMEs will be difficult with the social 
partners, but almost impossible without them. 
 
Deliberation and Liberal Market Economies 
If the advantage of coordinated market economies is their organizational capacity, 
the great strength of liberal market economies is their reliance on free markets to 
coordinate expectations.  And make no mistake, the free market is the best mechanism for 
the decentralized coordination of action in human history.  Yet markets sometimes fail to 
produce socially optimal outcomes; this is the vexing, but all too common, problem of 
market failure.  One of the prime cases of market failure is that of sub-optimal investment 
in the skills of the workforce, which is the empirical case study with which this book has 
been centrally concerned (cf. Booth & Snower, 1996).  Markets similarly fail to build the 
cost of negative externalities, such as pollution, into the system of prices.  The problems 
of the Chesapeake Bay, as of many other environmentally threatened areas, remind us 
that markets do not solve all ills. 
There is a move underway to “reinvent government” in the United States, 
exemplar par excellence of the liberal market economy (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) 
(Donahue, Forthcoming).  Does the option of mimicking market mechanisms provide a 
way for liberal market economies (LMEs) to overcome their informational deficits in 
solving problems of decentralized cooperation?  Probably not.  The problems of 
government in gaining access to information that is either local or relational are not in 
any way eased by the adoption of market mechanisms.  One clear example of the 
informational limits of markets, discussed in Chapter Five, was the marketization of 
training provision adopted in the French region of Picardy.  The regional council first 
attempted to adopt a policy to stimulate firm investment in training, but it quickly 
realized it lacked the informational resources from private associations necessary to 
enable the policy to succeed.  The region then moved to adopt measures to clarify the 
market for training provision, establishing measures for allowing individuals to compare 
training providers directly before choosing one.  This policy did nothing to elicit 
employer coordination, as it was unable to target aid directly at the most likely 
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providers, the policy was likely to succeed; but in convincing actors to change their 
fundamental training patterns, it was a failure. 
Liberal market economies will also have to develop organizational interlocutors 
for states if they want to succeed in securing decentralized cooperation.  Other things 
equal, the organizational weakness of these economies means that policies premised on 
decentralized cooperation are more likely to fail than in coordinated market economies.  
And the weakness of organizations in the American case extends beyond employers’ 
associations and unions.  (Skocpol, 1999) has amassed an impressive array of data 
showing that organizations with strong federalist structures—that is, with a central 
leadership but with organizational and mobilizing capacity across the states of the 
union—are in decline (cf. Putnam 2000).  They are being replaced in the American 
organizational landscape by groups that maintain offices and a presence in Washington, 
but little local organizational structure to support those central offices (Berry, 1999).  
Such organizations are no more likely than the government itself to have access to local 
or relational knowledge when their organizations do not exist at the local level.  Those 
countries lacking the solid mechanisms for non-market coordination characteristic of the 
coordinated market economy are disadvantaged in this respect, and they have an 
incentive to develop either associational capacity, or some sort of functional equivalent, 
to be able to benefit from the insights of local information. 
But as we saw in the case of the Chesapeake, decentralized cooperation in the 
LMEs is not hopelessly quixotic. The construction of the Chesapeake’s Tributary Teams 
showed that governments are capable of empowering actors on the ground through the 
creation of institutions that can get access to local knowledge.  The secret ingredient here 
is to create a discourse of common interest around which actors, who actually disagree in 
many other respects, can see that they share a paramount common interest (e.g., “Save 
the Bay”).  The institutions of corporatist governance in the coordinated market 
economies are premised on the idea that potentially competing actors can indeed come to 
mutually and societal beneficial results through cooperation.  Liberal market economies 
do not generally share a discourse that highly values this sort of collaboration, and it is 
one that they probably need to develop in order to build up local participation in such 
structures of quasi-private interest governance.  In the case of the Chesapeake Bay, once Decentralized Cooperation and the Future of Regulatory Reform  31 
   
the need to clean-up the bay was widely acknowledged, the lack of groups with 
established negotiating routines was advantageous in that it did not set off a competitive 
dynamic among groups worried about defending their organizational turf.  Thus, the 
advantage for governments in liberal market economies is the ability to construct ad hoc 
cooperative institutions without the threat of existing organizations’ actively undermining 
them.  That will only work, though, when the state can create a discourse under which 
actors can agree that the failure to create cooperation would be costly to all concerned. 
 
The regulatory challenge posed by decentralized cooperation seems almost 
taunting to state policymakers.  There are a set of potential, cooperative, welfare-
improving solutions out there to be adopted, if only they can persuade private actors to 
coordinate their actions on such an outcome.  But, to the great exasperation of the 
policymakers trying to secure decentralized cooperation across the industrialized world, 
these private actors are currently in a stable pattern of interaction.  If a single actor 
chooses to deviate from his standard pattern of behavior while almost all other actors do 
not, then he gets an outcome worse than that achieved by those who do not pursue the 
cooperative path, and who instead take advantage of the solitary cooperator.  Because 
reforms aimed at generating decentralized cooperation create tremendous uncertainty 
among actors about what the potential payoffs to different courses of action are, success 
depends on identifying and changing the minds of the most likely cooperators in the 
population. This is the group I have designated the waverers.  And states, for all their 
information-gathering prowess, are not well-adapted to identify and know how to 
persuade the waverers. 
I have argued throughout this book that private sector associations will be 
uniquely well-placed to get access to private information about the waverers, and to 
develop policies that will target them disproportionately. Strategies premised on using 
sanctions to convince actors to move to the desired equilibrium will be ineffectual 
because they lack credibility:  sanctioning will only work once a certain number of actors 
have moved to the new societal equilibrium, and defection from this equilibrium is 
widely acknowledged as being “sanctionable.”  Since states are very good at levying 
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from them, they will need to work closely with capable private sector organizations in 
order to develop policies that can most effectively target the waverers and convince them 
of the benefits to requited cooperation. 
  Of course, the organizational infrastructure of a polity influences the odds of 
success in such a reform project.  In problems of decentralized cooperation, coordinated 
market economies enjoy an advantage over liberal market economies.  But this 
disadvantage is not insurmountable:  public policy, anywhere, can enable states to 
overcome stable, societally deleterious patterns of behavior.  Despite the tremendous 
insights generated by societal equilibrium scholars like Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) and 
David Soskice (1999), their work is grim reading for those policymakers who want to 
improve the lives of their citizens.  They are right that stable patterns of interaction are 
very hard to break out of, and my study confirms this finding.  Creating decentralized 
cooperation is difficult, and we saw that there were many more cases of failure than of 
success.  States must learn that information is a precious commodity in the attempt to 
create decentralized cooperation, whereas sanctioning is a relatively weak capacity.  
Governments must build and use links to private information, because they will not be 
able to get the information they need without such conduits.  In this narrow sense, Max 
Weber now has little to teach them:  their information is no longer especially pertinent, 
and their monopoly on legitimate coercion is no longer particularly effective.  Once they 
recognize the value of local knowledge, deliberation, and the consequent capacity to 
mobilize, though, states can indeed succeed in eliciting new forms of cooperation, even in 
societies marked by past patterns of distrust.  If politics is the art of the possible, 
policymakers should draw some comfort from the fact that the politics of decentralized 
cooperation is still a question of using state capabilities, in combination with private 
information, to contribute to the common good.  
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